Us counter terrorism manual

Meanwhile, circumstances have changed. New threats have emerged, causing many to argue that U. These include the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition as the United States is only just awakening from a period of strategic atrophy.

It mentions new challenges to U. Its catalogue of threats includes rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction; non-state actors including terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, cyber hackers, and others with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Finally, it notes a U. Defense officials have called for re-balancing, meaning that while U. It is the negative part of the phrase relating to terrorism that commands attention. It raises a series of questions.

How will the United States conduct counterterrorism during an era in which great power competition has been defined as the number-one national security priority? What effect will the shift in priorities have on the military institution itself? What are the potential risks? What are the political consequences? For reasons I will come to later in the essay, this has to be a national discussion, not exclusively a military debate. As General Michael Nagata stated recently during a West Point Combating Terrorism Center roundtable—and I agree—it is a mistake to view decisions regarding the trade-off between defense planning and resources to great power competition or counterterrorism as a zero-sum game.

It is not a matter of guessing the right one. And it is not a matter of making a case for counterterrorism—that is not my purpose here. Future warfare may involve messy combinations of conflict modes some of which may be new, such as cyber and call upon all U. While the NDS is emphatic that terrorism is no longer the priority, two factors may serve as countervailing forces. Counterterrorism is events-driven. Terrorists events can command public attention and prompt public reactions that outweigh defense priorities.

The second factor, as General Nagata pointed out, is the strategic and political calculations of leadership. A president may seek to avoid military intervention, figuring that it will drag the country into a no-win, no-exit mess for which he or she will be blamed. But he or she will be criticized for projecting an image of American weakness, thereby inviting new terrorist outrages.

A president may, on the other hand, calculate that the situation demands an immediate military response or, alternatively, that withdrawal of already deployed forces brings unacceptable political risk.

Or a president may reckon that his political base wants out of endless wars, regardless of the longer-term risks. This is not to say that military strategy does not apply, or assert that the public opinion is fickle and politicians are feckless.

Rather it is to note that public opinion is often divided on these strategic choices. The differences reflect deeply held philosophical views and do not change easily although the emotive power of terrorism gives it short-term advantage.

It is the absence of overwhelming consensus in favor of one or the other strategic priorities that makes strategic and political calculations so difficult and helps explain some of the reversals we have seen. To address the future course of counterterrorism, it will be helpful to step back in time to explore how we got here. Where we are now reflects decades of events and responses—political and strategic decisions made in response to changing threats, but often reflecting past experiences.

As often as it seemed necessary to use military power, avoiding the repetition of past debacles like the Vietnam War or the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq pulled equally in the opposite direction. This essay provides a series of observations, grouped into eight sections, with implications for the role U. The first section of the essay will examine the difficulties in backing away from counterterrorism while terrorists still remain a threat and withdrawal from certain conflict zones poses national security as well as political risks.

That leads to the question of whether the United States can effectively suppress or at least contain terrorist groups abroad without being dragged into costly counterinsurgency campaigns and nation-building missions, which is the subject of the second section. Without attempting to predict the shape of future wars, the third section of the article argues that future near-peer contests may be very different from past military contests with major powers.

Dividing military operations into normal -war and everything-else columns makes little sense. Defense spending currently accounts for approximately half of total discretionary spending.

That may not continue in the post-pandemic environment. What this means for counterterrorism budgets is discussed in the fourth section. Shifting priorities from counterterrorism to strategic competition does not mean discarding competence.

That is the subject of the fifth section, which outlines the long march away from counterinsurgency after the Vietnam War and the gradual, often reluctant, military engagement in counterterrorism operations from the late s onward. The sixth section argues that the hard-won skills that result from decades of counterterrorism operations are fungible, indeed valuable to future military challenges, including great power competition and near-peer warfare.

At the same time, counterterrorism should not be seen as deriving from immutable doctrine handed down through the years. Terrorism itself, the seventh section argues, is constantly evolving, demanding new approaches and new capabilities. The ability to rapidly adapt to a changing threat landscape is a prerequisite in counterterrorism—and a more broadly applicable capability in strategic competition. The eighth and concluding section takes us back to the original question of how the United States will conduct counterterrorism as great power competition becomes the priority mission and summarizes the final reflections.

Reflection is the operative term here. A personal perspective is unavoidable. As noted, my comments reflect a personal perspective: My formative military experience as an officer in the 7th Special Forces Group during the intervention in the Dominican Republic and in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam; my subsequent tours in Vietnam as a member of a newly created Long Range Planning Task Group; and my experience as a reserve officer still assigned to Special Forces admittedly influence my views.

Throughout this period, I remained deeply critical of the U. The Army, in my view, viewed the Vietnam War as an exotic interlude between the wars that really counted—World War II and a future conflict with Soviet forces in Europe—and therefore, it never fully embraced a counterinsurgency strategy.

We did not protect and could not gain the allegiance of the people. The immensity of U. After withdrawal, the Vietnam experience was all but erased. Terrorism and irregular warfare have dominated my professional life since then. As terrorist violence escalated and terrorist attacks increasingly had strategic consequences, I became convinced that there was an appropriate military role in counter-terrorism—a role, not a solution.

Military force would be an essential part. The United States had already responded to terrorist attacks with military force on several occasions. The critical difference this time was that in previous cases, the United States responded to terrorist attacks with a single strike, then waited to see what terrorists or their state sponsors would do.

And if we were going to send young men—and increasingly women—into combat, they deserved an expression of national support. I had no doubt it would require a long-term effort, one possibly lasting decades. New networks would have to be created to exploit intelligence across national frontiers.

The strategy would have to include political warfare, aimed at reducing the appeal of the extremists and encouraging alternative views. The goals of the war could not be accomplished unilaterally—international cooperation would be a prerequisite for success. However, I warned against keeping a large number of American troops in Afghanistan and expressed deep skepticism about getting into nation-building.

National institutions hardly existed in the country. This was not about winning a war, but about a relentless pursuit, continuing intelligence collection, and when required, brief military interventions.

For the most part, few in the Pentagon agreed with my thinking. It distracted from the campaign in Afghanistan, significantly increased the burden on U. In more recent years, I have worried that exaggerated apprehension on the part of politicians and a fearful public that sought to abolish all risk was keeping the United States engaged in perpetual wars on distant frontiers and a never-ending quest for absolute security at home.

Over time, this obsession would have a corrosive effect on our political system. My purpose here, however, is not to settle old scores, defend the role of special forces, or argue against reallocating military resources.

Rather, I aim to provoke a broader discussion about the nature of future wars, the future of counterterrorism as a military mission, and the possible effects of shifting priorities. Observation 1: It will be difficult to demote counterterrorism Military planners cannot claim that terrorism is no longer the primary concern because the counterterrorism mission has been accomplished and terrorists are no longer a threat.

The National Security Strategy, 7 the National Counterterrorism Strategy 8 —both prepared by the current administration, and the latest Worldwide Threat Assessment, which reflects the consensus view of the U. Some analysts go further and argue that the worldwide jihadi menace—our current foe—is more dangerous than ever.

It went underground or scattered to other jihadi fronts in Africa and South and Southeast Asia. Whether the Taliban will keep the jihadis under control as they have promised is questionable.

As a recent U. The United States currently has about 8, troops actively engaged in Afghanistan, 13 approximately 5, in Iraq a figure set to be reduced to 3, this month , 14 and under 1, still deployed in Syria.

Bringing U. President Barack Obama wanted to end U. When the military situation in Afghanistan appeared to be worsening, President Obama ultimately opted to send in reinforcements, although he accompanied the decision with a schedule for the eventual departure of all U.

He was later forced to abandon this timetable. While campaigning for president, Donald Trump promised to pull out of the war in Afghanistan. It has been equally difficult to walk away from the Middle East. Two years into his administration, President Obama had to deal with rapidly evolving events resulting from the tumult that began with the so-called Arab Spring in In the months that followed the troop withdrawal, protests and armed uprisings occurred across the Arab world.

Syria descended into a civil war that the jihadis exploited. The collapse of Iraqi defenses in as Islamic State forces swept east obliged the United States to renew military operations to prevent further massacres and to preclude the Islamic State from becoming a new base for terrorist operations against the West.

Washington assembled an international coalition and led an ongoing air campaign, which supported ground offenses by Iraqi and U.

As a businessman in , Trump expressed support for a rapid withdrawal of U. The policy reversals reflect events. Military commanders understandably want to turn their attention to what they consider to be greater threats to U.

Presidents want out as well, but must also calculate the political risks. A major terrorist attack on U. It could also prompt demands for new military interventions. The safest political course has been to accept the continuing military burden, kicking the can down the road, rather than risk being blamed for a new major terrorist attack or being propelled into new military adventures.

Observation 2: There will likely be a further shift to counterterrorism without counterinsurgency Even without a shift in priorities, the U. Direct U. The U. Counterterrorism operations, however, will continue in the Middle East and elsewhere. How did we get here? Unfolding events after , plus hubris, overreach, strategic error, and mission creep pushed the United States into large-scale counterinsurgency and nation-building missions. Instead of the predicted vertical escalation, terrorism violence spread horizontally.

That produced an untold amount of suffering, but it had one positive effect. Directly threatened, governments that might otherwise have preferred to remain bystanders joined the global counterterrorist campaign. However, major terrorist attacks also occurred in Spain and the United Kingdom, and smaller-scale attacks occurred in the United States along with the continued discovery of terrorist plots.

These lent credence to the continuing terrorist threat. Meanwhile, the United States found itself dealing with escalating insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraqi resistance grew out of the chaos created by the removal of the ruling political structure, the disbandment of the Iraqi army, and the failure of the invading forces to maintain control.

The deteriorating situation in Iraq diverted attention and resources from Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban to make a comeback. It is extremely difficult to divide expenditures into counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, but counterinsurgency tends to be far costlier.

Counterinsurgency operations required larger deployments of U. Nor were counterinsurgency operations a domain where the U. Coming 30 years after the U. It was, however, unprepared for an enemy who understood that it could not hope to defeat the U. Army on a conventional battlefield, and who therefore chose to wage war from the shadows.

By , the U. With only the embryo of a new national army in Afghanistan and with the Iraqi army disbanded, the burden of fighting fell largely on the United States and, of course, those allies willing to engage in combat.

The Rewards for Justice program continues to be one of the most valuable U. Government assets in the fight against international terrorism. The US National Counterterrorism Center NCTC is pleased to present the International Terrorism Guide Website, a ready reference guide for law enforcement, intelligence, military and security personnel, contingency planners, or citizens concerned about international terrorist threats.

This site contains many features across the full range of issues pertaining to international terrorism: technical pages on various threat-related topics, terrorist groups, and wanted terrorists.. Department of State. The Secretary of State authorizes rewards for information that leads to a terrorist that commits an act of terrorism directed against Americans, leads to the locations of a key terrorist leader, or that disrupts terrorism financing. The site also contains a timeline of events relating to international terrorism, including dates that international terrorists may believe are important if planning attacks to commemorate particular events.

The guide reflects that statutorily mandated mission. Thus, this Guide focuses on the international terrorist organizations that are assessed to present the most serious threats to the United States. Currently, these threats come from violent extremists inspired by the Islamic State in the Levant ISIL and al-Qa'ida, including its allies and affiliates.

Committed to conducting attacks inside the United States and against United States interests abroad, these groups promote an ideology that presents a radical vision of Islam that is not followed or endorsed by most Muslims, including those within the United States. Muslims are an extremely diverse group geographically, ethnically, and religiously, and the vast majority reject violent extremist ideology.

Indeed, Muslims around the world comprise the main victims of attacks by these groups. There are other organized groups that engage in violent acts—some are criminal organizations with no political or social agenda, and some are domestic terrorist groups. These include other types of violent extremists—such as white supremacists and eco-terrorists—who commit violence in this country and present significant terrorist threats.

I consider that Pakistan, with all its imperfections is on the right track. After all, if one looks at the appalling economic mess the Western pariah countries have inflicted upon themselves over the last few years, together with the destruction they have created in mostly Islamic countries Pakistan is starting to look like a role model, which many countries would do well to emulate, and of course the US in particular.

My only criticism of Pakistan is that they do not repel the Drone attacks, which are mainly killing innocent people. Obviously, drone attacks do not appear to bother you. Sexton Blake: Wow, you say "When will the Pakistan Government get real and start protecting innocent Pakistanis from American brutality.

Did our parliamentary forget the fate of recommendations of Parliamentary Committee on National Security ans consequent unanimous resolution of the parliament for redefining the terms of engagement with the US after Salala check post attack by NATO helicopters. The hue and cry in the senate is nothing but a public relation exercise for domestic consumption.

What a sham democracy and sham dramatics these people put on. Utter waste of taxpayers money and Citizen's time. If only somebody had the courage to play their part with honesty. Pakistan as President of UNSC should do something immediately to stop such strikes on innocent civilians. Who do the Senate think they are kidding. Pakistan has allowed the US military to routinely carry out their dreadful war crimes for 12 years now and has never taken any serious steps to stop them.

It should be realized that a recent report from Stanford Law School indicates that the number of high level targets from drones is less than 2 per cent. However, the killing of children is much higher. When will the Pakistan Government get real and start protecting innocent Pakistanis from American brutality. If Pakistan doesn't want the international community to "violate" its territorial sovereignty, it has to first eliminate terrorists based and nurtured in its territory from attacking other nations.

Until and unless Pakistan does this, it loses its argument of sovereignty. LOLs at the uproar from both sides of the aisle. Senators furious? Thanks ET. Pakistan has no guts to stop US or to wipe your terror from its own land. Several behaviors, when taken in context, can indicate radicalized individuals are mobilizing—preparing to engage in violence to advance their cause. These behaviors include seeking out training, building capability, and other preparatory behaviors. The below factors drive the mobilization process and may interact to mobilize individuals toward violence.

A lack of access to some or all of these factors may cause some individuals to back away from violence or result in individuals changing their plans. Readiness to act can vary across time and be influenced by multiple factors—including personal will and competence, experiences while in training, and motivation gained or lost as a result of established relationships.

This can range from target practice at a local firing range to explosives training with terrorists overseas. Opportunity can also include having available time to engage in violent activities. TARGETS: Locations that the individual is familiar with because of where he or she lives or works or is interested in because of what they represent, such as supposed economic, political, or military dominance by the West.

For additional information, please visit DHS. Swatting includes spoofing or masking Caller ID information, which is legal, simple to use, and used by many businesses. There are no means available to quickly, accurately, and inexpensively identify swatting calls, so there is little choice but to dispatch resources.

These vehicles are typically decommissioned by departments and are publicly available for purchase at auctions or on the Internet:. First responders should remain openminded while performing medical and trauma assessments.

Hastily or expediently treated injuries may be an indicator of suspicious activity, as those injured may not seek immediate medical care or use efforts to obscure the true nature of the injury. AQAP is a Sunni extremist group based in Yemen that orchestrated numerous high-profile terrorist attacks. The group formally pledged loyalty in September to Bin Ladin, changed its name in , and wages regional low-level guerilla insurgency.

Since , terrorist and insurgent group al Shabaab has worked to remove Western influence from Somalia and establish an Islamic state. Since , al-Shabaab has launched high-profile operations in neighboring countries, most notably the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September and the attack against a restaurant in Djbouti popular with Westerners in May The group has used suicide attacks against Lebanese Hizballah and Shia interests and Lebanese security forces in Lebanon, and in August kidnapped 11 security personnel and beheaded two others.

Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early s, ASG engages in bombings, assassinations, extortion, and kidnappings for ransom and has ties to Jemaah Islamiyah.